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ABSTRACT 
The title of this thesis refers to a quote attributed 
to General “Hap” Arnold as he parted ways with the two 
commanders of a newly created unit that would soon become 
designated the 1st Air Commando Group. Having already 
coined the force as his “air commandos,” General Arnold’s 
parting words to John Alison and Phil Cochran were, “To 
hell with the paperwork; go out and fight” (in Kelly, 1996, 
p. 15).  Perhaps no statement better captures the essence 
of what it meant to be an Air Commando.  This thesis adopts 
an organizational design framework proposed by Vijay Sathe 
in order to explore the culture of the historic Air 
Commandos.   
The organizational culture of the Air Commandos is 
important because it nurtures the attributes that help 
define today’s Air Force special operations forces.  
Throughout this thesis, three overwhelming themes emerge 
regarding the basic assumptions and beliefs (the 
organizational culture) of the Air Commandos.  Each of the 
themes provides insight into the internal integration of 
the Air Commandos and suggests how they negotiated their 
external environment.  The shared beliefs and basic 
assumptions of the Air Commandos include:  Humans are the 
most critical resources in an organization; innovation, 
improvisation, and adaptation are more important than 
advanced technology; successful mission accomplishment is 
more important than adherence to standard military 
conventions.   
 vi
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To the memory of the Airmen who lost their lives in 
the crash of Wrath 11.  In sacrificing their lives for the 
greater good of our country, they embodied the best of what 
it means to be a modern-day Air Commando.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. A DARK NIGHT IN ALBANIA 
A painting hangs in the upstairs lounge of the 7th 
Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at RAF Mildenhall, United 
Kingdom, depicting an airdrop to a team of Air Force 
Special Tactics personnel standing amongst a debris field 
on a snow covered mountain in Albania. The debris field is 
all that remains of Wrath 11, a MC-130H Combat Talon II 
aircraft that crashed on the mountain during a low level 
training mission. The perspective of the artist is looking 
out the back of the cargo compartment of an aircraft as it 
flies over the crash site.  Loadmasters, secured to the 
aircraft by their harnesses, sit on the ramp as they watch 
a single parachute float down.  Suspended beneath the 
parachute is a bundle containing a host of personal items 
that will serve as a makeshift memorial to the fallen 
crewmembers of Wrath 11.  
The crew of Wrath 11 was assigned to the 7th SOS, 
352nd Special Operations Group, RAF Mildenhall, UK.  The 
unit is part of the Air Force Special Operations Command 
(AFSOC.)  AFSOC was established at Hurlburt Field, Florida, 
in May 1990, as the USAF component of USSOCOM.  The 
command’s public affairs office reports there are currently 
over 16,000 active duty, civilian, Air National Guard, and 
Air Force Reserve personnel assigned to AFSOC.  These 
airmen are organized within one numbered air force, two 
active duty wings, one Air Force Reserve wing, one National 
Guard wing, two overseas groups, and several other direct 
reporting units.   
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AFSOC operates various fixed wing and tilt-rotor 
aircraft to include the MC-130E/H/P/W, AC-130H/U, EC-130, 
CV-22, and PC-12.  It also conducts unmanned aerial vehicle 
operations utilizing the MQ-1 Predator.  Regarding the 
command’s mission, the public affairs office reports,  
The command's SOF are composed of highly trained, 
rapidly deployable Airmen, conducting global 
special operations missions ranging from 
precision application of firepower, to 
infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and 
refueling of SOF operational elements (Air Force 
Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office, 
2008).  
The command currently conducts these missions in ongoing 
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in many 
other countries throughout the world.   
Although under the administrative control of AFSOC, 
the crew of Wrath 11 was under the operational control of 
the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) on the night 
of the accident.  They were tasked with performing training 
missions as part of a Joint Combined Exercise Training 
(JCET) deployment to Tirana, Albania.  On the evening of 
March 31, 2005, the crew departed their temporary base at 
Tirana-Rinas airfield on a night tactical mission intending 
to accomplish the following events:  Night Vision Goggle 
(NVG) and radar terrain following/terrain avoidance low-
level procedures, airdrops, and blacked-out landings.    
Low illumination compounded by unfavorable visibility 
complicated Wrath 11’s transition to NVG low-level 
operations as they approached steep terrain after their 
departure from Tiranas.  The Air Force’s Accident 
Investigation Board (2005) concluded that the aircrew “did 
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not identify and utilize what would have been the necessary 
start climbing point to climb over a 5500 foot saddle that 
was the controlling terrain” along their flight path.  The 
aircraft “impacted the ground near a ridgeline at 
approximately 5700 feet above sea level.” 
None of the airmen onboard the MC-130H survived the 
impact.  The crash of Wrath 11 proved to be the deadliest 
in the Air Force during 2005. Furthermore, the tragedy 
represented the fourth loss of a MC-130H Combat Talon II 
aircraft over the previous three year period (none of which 
were attributable to enemy action.)    
B. AFSOC’S MISSION REVIEW 
The Air Force Safety Center classifies the most 
serious aviation accidents as “Class A Mishaps.” These are 
accidents that produce a fatality or in which aircraft are 
destroyed (or damaged in excess of a certain dollar 
amount.) The Safety Center then converts the raw numbers of 
accidents into a rate (mishaps per 100,000 flight hours) 
that is used to monitor the health of flying programs 
throughout the major commands of the Air Force.   
The Air Force Special Operations Command led the 
entire Air Force in FY 2005 with a Class A Mishap Rate of 
10.35.  This rate was well above the Air Force’s average of 
1.49 for FY 2005 (Air Force Safety Center, 2005).    Closer 
examination revealed that since September, 2001, AFSOC 
reported 18 Class A mishaps across its fleet of eight 
disparate weapon system types (Headquarters Air Force 
Special Operations Command, 2005).  This accident total was 
unacceptably high; something clearly had to be done.     
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In order to change AFSOC’s vector, the commander, 
Lieutenant General Michael Wooley, took immediate action.  
A host of safety stand-downs, reviews, and initiatives were 
put in place to right the ship.  The cornerstone of this 
process was the implementation of a thorough “Mission 
Review.”  This study was comprehensive in nature; it 
examined all functions in the command, expanding its scope 
beyond those weapon systems involved in the most recent 
mishaps.  Most significantly, the review “focused the 
command on changing current conditions to prevent future 
mishaps” (Headquarters Air Force Special Operations 
Command, 2005). 
Colonel Carroll Greene, the Chief of Operational 
Psychology at AFSOC, was instrumental in the completion of 
the 2005 Mission Review.  His original tasking led to two 
years of follow-on research that looked into the 
organizational culture of AFSOC. His work was the impetus 
for a strategic communication campaign within the command 
itself; the centerpiece of the campaign was a message from 
Lieutenant General Donald Wurster (the new commanding 
general) entitled “AFSOC’s 13 Critical Attributes of 
Success.”  A poster was made for each attribute, and the 
posters were disseminated for display in organizations 
across the command (see the Appendix for a list of the 
attributes.)   
The 13 attributes supposedly provide the definition 
for what it means to be a modern-day Air Commando (the 
heritage of the Air Commandos will be provided in Chapter 
III.)  Closer examination, however, reveals that these 
attributes are no different from the attributes required 
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for success in any major command in the Air Force, or for 
that matter, in any other branch of the military.  They are 
generic in nature and fail to distinguish how being an Air 
Commando is different from being an Airman (a term similar 
to soldier or sailor, used when referring to a member of 
the USAF.)   
While AFSOC’s 13 Critical Attributes of Success fail 
to clearly differentiate an Air Commando from an Airman, 
the decision to implement the program is commendable.  The 
program provides a clear message to the rank and file that 
the senior leadership of the command recognizes the vital 
importance of organizational culture.  When compared to the 
other service components resident within USSOCOM, culture, 
arguably, plays a more important role in defining what is 
special about AFSOC. 
C.  THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURE IN AFSOC 
 To understand the importance of organizational culture 
in AFSOC, an appreciation must be gained for the defining 
characteristics of special operations forces (SOF) in 
general.  Various authors such as Vandenbroucke (1993), 
McRaven (1995), Tucker & Lamb (2007), and Adams (1998), as 
well as the service doctrine documents complement each 
other in providing commonalities indicative of the defining 
characteristics of special operations forces.  A 
distillation of the literature suggests that special 
operations forces possess three unique characteristics: 
special attributes, special requirements, and a special 
purpose.   
 Special operations forces have a special purpose in 
that they are typically founded to pursue important 
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political or military strategic objectives that are too 
costly or risky to attempt with general purpose forces.  
Special operations forces possess special attributes such 
as speed, surprise, and security that are required for 
achieving McRaven’s concept of relative superiority.  
Finally, they exhibit special requirements such as special 
training, uniquely modified equipment, and the assessment 
and selection of their personnel. 
AFSOC has always been labeled a notable exception to 
the rule that special operations forces must have an 
assessment and selection program.  Such discussions have 
hinged on the concept that “AFSOF might be viewed as being 
defined more by special platforms than by special 
operators” (Spulak, 2007, p. 12).  The concept of “self 
selection”—one’s own desire to volunteer for or stay in 
AFSOC—has also been used as an explanation (p. 12).  Recent 
studies, however, suggest that AFSOC might not need a 
universal assessment and selection program due to the very 
nature of the desired attributes themselves—perhaps they 
are actually behavioral, and not character, traits.  To 
consider this possibility, two reports by Robert Spulak and 
Jessica Glicken Turnley will be examined. 
Robert Spulak (2007) presents his theory of special 
operations in a report authored for the Joint Special 
Operations University (JSOU) at Hurlburt Field, Florida.  
The thrust of his argument hinges on the premise that it is 
personnel, not assigned missions or technologically 
advanced equipment, that defines special operations forces 
(p. 13).  Personnel attributes are important to Spulak 
because he asserts that they permit the development of 
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special qualities (p. 10).  Although SOF assesses and 
selects recruits with respect to personal attributes, 
Spulak states that such character attributes are “necessary 
but not sufficient to explain the origin of SOF” (p. 14).    
In a JSOU report entitled Retaining a Precarious Value 
as Special operations Go Mainstream, Jessica Glicken 
Turnley (2008) builds upon Spulak’s work.  She discusses 
the implications of the different types of attributes: 
When viewed from the outside, the specialness of 
SOF often gets characterized as behavioral, 
rather than character, traits.  This tendency is 
an important distinction.  Character traits are 
indicators of the potential for certain types of 
behavior.  Behavior can be learned through 
training and other mechanisms. (p. 14) 
Glicken Turnley advances the formulation of a behavioral 
definition for SOF.   
In her argument, Glicken Turnley references comments 
by Vice Admiral Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force 
Transformation in the DoD from 2001 through 2005.  
Specifically, she notes that in his remarks on SOF, none of 
the defining characteristics he identifies are character 
based (p. 15).  She concludes by saying, “If the defining 
characteristics are behavioral, in theory different 
training, equipment, or organization could allow the 
general-purpose military to become more SOF-like” (p. 16).  
This is particularly relevant to AFSOC because, in the 
absence of a command-wide assessment and selection process, 
most of its aircrew members, although subsequently trained 
for their specific mission sets, are in fact “regular” 
members of the “general-purpose” Air Force when they enter 
the command. 
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In summary, although character traits are a defining 
quality of most special operations forces, behavior might 
best explain the essence of what makes AFSOC “special.” It 
is through the organizational culture of an organization 
that desired behaviors are developed and reinforced.  
Spulak (2007) reinforces this claim by saying, “Another, 
perhaps more important, factor is the culture of SOF that 
nurtures and develops the appropriate attributes” (p. 12).  
Because of this need to nurture and develop desired 
attributes, organizational culture is of paramount 
importance to AFSOC. 
D. ABOUT THIS STUDY 
This study endeavors to examine the historic Air 
Commandos of the Second World War and Vietnam through the 
lens of their organizational culture.  In his study project 
for the US Army War College, Colonel Jerry Thigpen (1991) 
asserts that, “Today’s [Air Force] special operators fit 
the mold of their predecessors” (p. 1).  This research 
attempts to further explore what exactly that mold is. A 
thorough investigation into the heritage of the Air 
Commandos is important because the command clings to their 
enduring legacy, even when the command’s espoused values 
differ from those of the original Air Commandos. 
A desire to chart this perceived gap between the 
“ideal” culture promulgated through programs such as 
AFSOC’s 13 Critical Attributes and the “real” culture 
representative of the legacy and heritage of the Air 
Commandos serves as the motivation for this study.  This 
research contributes to that exploration by attempting to  
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decipher the “real” culture of the Air Commandos.  
Specifically, this study will attempt to address the 
following research questions: 
• Who were the Air Commandos? 
• What was the organizational culture of the Air 
Commandos? 
In order to provide the background necessary to answer 
these two questions, the reader will be introduced to the 
concept of organizational culture in Chapter II.  A 
framework for analysis will also be presented.  The 
framework will be applied in Chapter III in attempting to 
decipher the culture of the Air Commandos after the reader 
has been introduced to their heritage.  The study concludes 
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
A. CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
Spulak’s theory underscores the importance of 
organizational culture and its criticality in nurturing the 
attributes that define special operations forces.  Because 
AFSOC does not have a universal assessment and selection 
program, organizational culture is a primary mechanism 
through which desired behaviors are developed and 
reinforced.  This chapter will review the basics of 
organizational culture, discuss ways of deciphering it, and 
conclude by introducing a conceptual framework with which 
the following chapter will analyze the legacy of the Air 
Commandos.  
1. Definition 
In Organizational Culture and Leadership, Edgar Schein 
(1985) transforms the concept of corporate culture from an 
abstract idea into a useful tool for managers, leaders, and 
students alike.  Considered the seminal work on the topic, 
the book provides a deep conceptual understanding of an 
often elusive and misunderstood phenomenon.  Schein not 
only defines culture, but discusses its importance and 
functions, as well as how leaders can shape and transmit 
it.  
There have been numerous attempts to capture the 
essence of what organizational culture is.  Although the 
term is openly used and most can agree that it exists and 
is important, there is often disagreement on its exact 
definition.  Schein suggests that much of the confusion 
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stems from the fact that many people’s definitions are in 
fact “reflections” of an organization’s culture, but not 
the “essence” of it. Examples of such reflections include 
rituals, demeanors, norms, philosophies, policies, rules, 
feelings, and climates (p. 6).  Schein acknowledges the 
importance of these manifestations, yet asserts that they 
fail to adequately address the essence of culture. 
Offering a richer definition of culture, Schein states 
the term represents  
the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs 
that are shared by members of an organization, 
that operate unconsciously, and that define in a 
basic ‘take-for-granted’ fashion an 
organization’s view of itself and its 
environment.  These assumptions and beliefs are 
learned responses to a group’s problems of 
survival in its external environment and its 
problems of internal integration. 
Because they solve these problems reliably and repeatedly, 
the assumptions and beliefs are thereby taken for granted.   
Similarly, Vijay Sathe (1985) defines organizational 
culture as “the set of important assumptions (often 
unstated) that members of a community share in common.”  
The assumptions he refers to are internalized beliefs and 
values; because beliefs and values are the determinants of 
attitudes and behaviors, they serve as “analytically a more 
powerful concept” (p. 13). Sathe draws attention to the 
elusive nature of culture because it is “unseen and maybe 
unheard.” (p. 10).  Sathe’s contribution to the definition 
of culture is complementary to Schein and is consistent 
with the views of other scholars on the subject.   
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Meryl Reis Louis (1985) isolates three basic 
components of organizational culture from the various 
definitions: content, group, and the relationship between 
content and group.  She identifies content as “a set of 
common understandings.”  In discussing the group component, 
she states that the culture represents a distinctive group—
“a community or population, a society or class, a unit.”  
Finally, Louis contends that there is a relationship 
between the content and the group that is unique, that 
there is “content peculiar to the group” (p. 74).  
Similarly, Louis’ contribution is reinforced by Joanne 
Martin (2002) in identifying two common theoretical 
features of definitions: “the use of the word ‘shared’ and 
a reference to culture as that which is distinctive or 
unique to a particular context.” (p. 56). 
2. Importance and Function 
The importance of culture, then, is that it solves the 
group’s “basic problems of (1) survival in and adaption to 
the external environment and (2) integration of its 
internal processes to ensure the capacity to continue to 
survive and adapt” (Schein, 1985, p. 50). By successfully 
accomplishing the organization’s core mission in the 
external environment, group members generate activities and 
interactions that lead to the formation of norms and 
sentiments within the internal system of the organization.  
A reciprocal process is started and sustained whereby such 
norms and sentiments then influence activities and 
interactions in the external environment.  
These activities and interactions compose the actual 
experiences of the people in the organization. Initially 
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the environment “influences the formation of culture, but 
once culture is present in the sense of shared assumptions, 
those assumptions, in turn, influence what will be 
perceived and defined as the environment.” (p. 51).  Sathe 
(1985) therefore concludes that “the content of culture 
derives from a combination of prior assumptions and new 
learning experiences.” (p. 14).   
3. Impact of Leaders 
Schein (1985) asserts that one of the most important 
functions of leaders is the creation, management, and 
destruction of organizational culture.  He suggests that 
culture and leadership are indeed “two sides of the same 
coin” (p. 2).  Leaders shape an organization’s culture as 
their “prescriptions for how to do things are adopted” (p. 
222).  They embed and transmit culture with their charisma 
and by articulating a clear and vivid vision within their 
organization (p. 223).  Schein introduces the possibility 
that “the only thing of real importance that leaders do is 
to create and manage culture and that the unique talent of 
leaders is their ability to work with culture.” (p. 2).   
The values and intentions of leaders are coded within 
the culture of an organization and “are passed on to new 
members as ‘the correct way to define the situation.’” (p. 
50). This culture provides members of a group with an 
integrated, historical perspective from which they are able 
to build an identity.  According to Sathe (1985), “Founders 
put their imprint on the culture by bringing in people who 
share certain beliefs and values with the founder, and 
these people will eventually share others” (p. 14).  In 
Bureaucracy, James Wilson (1989) adds that this “imprint is 
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the deepest and most lasting when the founding executive 
has a strong personality and a forcefully expressed vision 
of what the organization should be.” (p. 96).  Because it 
permeates thoughts, perceptions, and feelings, culture 
provides meaning to the situations the members encounter 
(Schein, 1985, p. 44). Therefore, according to Schein, 
culture has a profound contribution on the effectiveness of 
an organization.           
B. DECIPHERING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
In Organizational Research Methods, Paul Brewerton and 
Lynne Millward (2001) assert that “organizational plans are 
often ineffective because of the incompatibility of those 
plans with organizational culture(s).” This suggests that 
“there must be a ‘fit’ between planning and the beliefs, 
values and practices within the organization.” (p. 136).  A 
fit can only be found through analysis and that requires the 
operationalization of the conceptual basis of organizational 
culture.   
The process through which organizational culture is 
deciphered and operationalized is important because inadequacy 
results in errors of analysis.  This leads to misunderstanding 
and the possible overstatement of potential benefits.  As 
James Wilson (1989) contends, “critics argue that culture is 
little more than a mushy word used to dignify the hunches and 
intuitions of softheaded writers” (p. 92).  It is imperative, 
therefore, that researchers define culture in the same way 
that they operationalize the concept.  Or, as Joanne Martin 
(2002) implores, it is critical that readers “examine what 
researchers actually study when they claim to be studying 
culture.” (p. 64). 
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Schein (1985) issues a similar warning by insisting 
that researchers must distinguish between the essence of 
culture (the basic assumptions) and the observation of 
manifestations of culture (values and behaviors.)  In an 
attempt to avoid conceptual confusion, he advances the 
notion of three “levels” of culture:  basic assumptions, 
values, and artifacts and creations (p. 14).  He defines 
these levels and discusses their interactions.   
“Basic Underlying Assumptions” constitute the heart of 
Schein’s concept of the essence of culture and are the key 
to understanding “what is going on and why” (p. 21).  He 
suggests that such basic assumptions “have become so taken 
for granted that one finds little variation within a 
cultural unit. . .members would find behavior based on any 
other premise inconceivable.”  They guide behavior and tell 
group members how to perceive and think; their potency lies 
in that they are nonconfrontable and nondebatable (p. 18).  
Although they are admittedly hard to locate, such 
assumptions can be brought to the surface through 
interviews conducted as part of an extensive longitudinal 
study of an organization.  Since such a professional effort 
is beyond the scope of this academic study, it is 
reassuring to see Schein assert that, “If we examine 
carefully an organization’s artifacts and values, we can 
try to infer the underlying assumptions that tie things 
together.” (p. 20). 
The second level of Schein’s cultural analysis 
consists of values.  He defines the term as “convictions 
about the nature of reality and how to deal with it” and as 
someone’s “sense of what ‘ought’ to be, as distinct from 
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what it is.” (p. 15).  Values that are “susceptible of 
physical or social validation, and that continue to work 
reliably in solving the group’s problems, will be 
transformed into assumptions.” (p. 16).   
An organization’s “espoused values” are important as 
well.  These “predict well enough what people will say in a 
variety of situations but which may be out of line with 
what they actually do in situations.” Schein warns that in 
the study of organizational culture, “one must discriminate 
carefully between those that are congruent with underlying 
assumptions and those that are, in effect, either 
rationalizations or aspirations” (p. 17). 
Incongruence between what people say and what they do 
contribute to a condition known as organizational pain.  In 
The Age of Design, Jeff Conklin (1996) introduces the term 
as a condition of “chaos, uncertainty, and overload” that 
is both “pervasive” but yet “hidden” within an 
organization.  It is “caused by the mismatch between our 
beliefs about life and work and the reality we experience.”  
This pain is not discussed, “not the subject of major 
studies, and there are no programs or initiatives to ease” 
the pain.  Furthermore, “The pain remains hidden from our 
sensibilities inside an outmoded and crumbling belief 
system” of values (p. 2).                 
Values, then, serve a normative or moral function in 
an organization.  They guide members of the group on how to 
act in certain situations (p. 16).  Values that are 
transformed into an ideology or philosophy can then help 
the organization overcome uncertainty in their environment.  
Schein contends, “Such values will predict much of the 
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behavior that can be observed at the artifactual level.” 
(p. 17).   
Artifacts constitute Schein’s final, and most easily 
observed, level of analysis.  Technology, art, and visible 
and audible patterns of behavior define this level (p. 14).  
Artifacts are the manifestations of an organization’s 
physical and social creations.  According to Louis (1985,) 
the symbols are the manifestations that are given most 
attention; myths, legends, stories, sagas and other 
linguistic symbols are prime examples (p. 84).  Schein 
warns “whereas it is easy to observe artifacts. . .the 
difficult part is figuring out what the artifacts mean, how 
they interrelate, what deeper patterns, if any, they 
reflect.” (p. 15).   
In the same vein as Schein and Martin, Vijay Sathe 
(1985) admits that culture “cannot be easily measured or 
directly observed.”  He states that “Other evidence. . 
.must be taken into account to infer what the culture is.” 
While conceding that the process is subjective and there 
are no “exact answers,” he nonetheless offers a systematic 
framework for deciphering the phenomenon (p. 16).  
Investigated in the following section, this will be the 
conceptual framework used to conduct the analysis in this 
study.        
C. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
The framework for deciphering culture that Vijay Sathe 
(1985) provides in Understanding Culture and Related 
Corporate Realities is the methodology adopted in examining 
the organizational cultures of the historic Air Commandos 
in the following chapter.  The analysis investigates the 
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historical evidence—Sathe contends that it “must be taken 
into account” in concert with the current evidence in order 
to develop an adequate understanding.  Most importantly, 
the “validity of the diagnosis” cannot be judged “by its 
correctness as determined by some objective criteria”; on 
the contrary, the purpose of the analysis is solely to 
identify “useful insights” for recommendations and 
conclusions (p. 16). 
Sathe’s framework provides a systemic method for 
inferring the content of culture.  The culture of an 
organization generates shared things, sayings, doings, and 
feelings that manifest as various objects, talk, behavior, 
and emotions.  These various manifestations of culture 
(communications, justifications, and behavior) are 
distilled in order to identify a more concise set of 
beliefs and values.  These beliefs and values may be 
further interpreted in order to infer meanings regarding 
the all-important shared assumptions of an organization (p. 
17).  Figure 1 depicts an adapted form of Sathe’s framework 
that will be used as the basis of analysis for this study.     
In examining cultural manifestations, both implicit 
and explicit forms of communication must be investigated.  
As previously mentioned, various manifestations might 
include customs, ceremonies, special language, folklore, 
logos, dress, and décor.  Perhaps more importantly, missing 
manifestations should also be investigated; their omission 
could identify what is considered taboo within an  
organization.  To assist the “distilling” process of 
deciphering a culture, Sathe recommends that three basic 
questions be explored (p. 18). 
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“What Is the Background of the Founders and Others Who 
Followed Them?”  The backgrounds and personalities of key 
leaders make an imprint on the culture of an organization.  
The resulting clues reveal much about the content of a 
culture (p. 19). 
“How Did the Organization Respond to Crises or Other 
Critical Events, and What Was the Learning from These 
Experiences?”  Sathe contends that culture evolves as a 
result of how an organization deals with stressful periods.  
Investigating crises and critical events can help identify 
how assumptions were formed and might help in determining 
the order of such assumptions (p. 19). 
“Who Are Considered Deviant in the Culture?  How Does 
the Organization Respond to Them?”  Identifying deviants 
helps to identify the boundaries of a culture.  Sathe 
suggests that understanding why certain people, practices, 
or things are rejected reveals important cultural 
assumptions (p. 20). 
The next chapter of this study will seek to examine 
the Air Commandos through the lens of the preceding three 
questions.  In answering each question, the conceptual 
framework depicted in Figure 1 will be applied in an 
attempt to ascertain one or more of Schein’s three levels 
of organizational culture.  In pursuing this objective, it 
is anticipated that some form of useful insight will be 
generated with respect to the organizational culture of the 
Air Commandos.  The results will then be presented to see 
if any conclusions or recommendations can be drawn.    
  
 













III. DECIPHERING THE CULTURE OF THE AIR COMMANDOS 
Chapter II presented an introduction to the concept of 
organizational culture and developed a framework for 
analysis.  This chapter attempts to decipher the culture of 
the Air Commandos.  Prior to doing so, their heritage will 
first be examined.  This legacy will focus on the 
Carpetbaggers and Air Commandos of the 1940s as well as the 
Air Commando wings of the Vietnam War.  Once this 
contextual background has been presented, the framework of 
analysis presented in the previous chapter will be applied 
to the legacy of the Air Commandos.  
A. THE LEGACY OF THE AIR COMMANDOS 
The history of the Air Commandos is rooted in the 
operations of the Army Air Corps in World War II; 
specifically, the legacy was formed around the exploits of 
the Chindits in the Pacific theater and the Carpetbaggers 
in the European theater.  However, airpower had been 
employed in support of unconventional operations as early 
as 1916 during Pershing’s pursuit of Pancho Villa.  It was 
also used by the British in support of TE Lawrence’s 
Palestine campaign during World War I (Thigpen, 1991, p. 
5).   
The first US airmen to be officially labeled as “Air 
Commandos” flew combat missions in support of an all-
British ground force in Asia during World War II.  However, 
they were not the first American airmen to build a heritage 
centered on unconventional warfare.  In fact, that heritage 
began during the trench warfare of World War I when covert 
missions were flown by aircraft that carried secret agents 
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safely across the lethal dangers of “no-mans-land” in order 
to land in farmers’ fields behind enemy lines (Moore, 1992, 
p. 9).  But it was not until the 1940s that the widespread 
use of aircraft was adopted for the execution of 
clandestine operations. 
The British were the first to conduct “special duties 
air operations” during the Second World War.  The Royal Air 
Force (RAF) flew Lysander, Hudson, and Halifax aircraft 
across the European continent in order to establish “vital 
links with clandestine organizations in enemy held 
territories.”  Such missions were flown by specialized 
squadrons stationed at bases in Britain, North Africa, 
Italy, and Corsica.  While the RAF commenced clandestine 
operations in 1940, it wasn’t until 1943 that the US Army 
Air Force (AAF) followed suit and “quickly learned from the 
developed expertise of the RAF” (Verity, 1978, p. 8). 
1. The Special Flight Section 
The AAF flew its first clandestine special operations 
missions from bases in North Africa.  Flying in support of 
the Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) base of operations 
in Algiers, the first mission was flown on the night of 20 
October, 1943 (Moore, 1992, p. 20).  The specially trained 
crew and highly modified B-17 were one of three assigned to 
the Special Flight Section attached to the Twelfth Air 
Force’s Fifth Bombardment Wing (p. 18).   
The first “Air Commando” mission took the aircraft 
from Blida Airfield (near Algiers) across the Mediterranean 
Sea and to a small drop zone in the French Alps near Lake 
Geneva.  The mission was flown at night and culminated with 
the aerial delivery of ten containers of ammunition, 
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weapons, and supplies to French resistance Maquisards under 
the supervision of a British agent.  German anti-aircraft 
artillery fire hit the B-17 on the way home resulting in 
the destruction of two of the aircraft’s four engines; 
regardless, the aircraft and crew successfully completed 
the AAF’s first special operations mission of the Second 
World War by recovering the aircraft on an emergency 
landing strip in North Africa (p. 20). 
The commander of the OSS, Brigadier General “Wild 
Bill” Donovan, had long envisioned commencing clandestine 
air operations into France from his London base, not from 
Algiers.  The OSS first requested AAF support in 
infiltrating and resupplying agents from England in 
February 1943 (p. 22).  However, Major General Ira Eaker, 
commanding officer of the Eighth Air Force, resisted the 
notion of giving up his much needed bombers for such 
“nickeling” missions that took combat power away from his 
main effort of conducting a strategic bomber offensive 
against Germany (p. 13).  The lengthy bureaucratic battle 
that ensued was only solved in September 1943, when the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the transfer of surplus B-
24s from a disbanded antisubmarine warfare unit to the 
OSS/AAF special operations program code-named Project 
CARPETBAGGER (p. 25). 
2. The Carpetbaggers 
The first two Carpetbagger squadrons (the 36th and 
406th) were activated in November 1943, and flew specially 
modified B-24s from RAF Alconbury in East Anglia, England, 
under the colors of the 482d Bombardment Group 
(Pathfinder).  Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
 26
Clifford Heflin, the unit moved to Watton aerodrome and 
eventually to Harrington, where two additional squadrons 
were added.  Eventually, the Carpetbaggers were designated 
the 492d Bombardment Group in 1944 (Warren, 1951, p. 498).  
Their end-strength consisted of more than sixty B-24 and 
five C-47 aircraft (Haas, 1997, p. 5).  
The Carpetbaggers primarily flew specially modified B-
24 Liberator aircraft.  The airframes were painted shiny 
black and blackout curtains were installed in an effort to 
conceal their visual signature during night low-level 
flying.  Turrets were removed and a special hatch was 
installed from which parachutists could be dropped.  
Blister windows were added to aid with visual pilotage and 
special navigation and communication equipment was 
installed (p. 499).  Fully loaded, the massive machines 
could carry approximately three tons of supplies, two 
parachutists, and up to ten 4,000-leaflet bundles (p. 502).  
The crews operating these converted bombers underwent an 
extensive training regimen. 
Special training was required due to the immense 
difference in mission sets.  The crews had originally been 
trained to fly at high altitude in formation during 
daylight while conducting their strategic bombing missions.  
In contrast, they were now being asked to fly low-level at 
night with fewer visual navigation reference points while 
conducting aerial resupply and infiltration missions.  
Aircrews planned all missions in “minute detail” resulting 
in “maximum coordination of effort.” (p. 501). Furthermore, 
because they were working in support of a clandestine OSS 
program, secrecy, security, and discipline were in high 
demand.  As one historian claims, “In no other work is the 
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individual crew as directly affected by leakage of 
information as in this particular project” (Parnell, 1987, 
p. 21).  
The first Carpetbagger mission to France took place on 
the night of 4 January 1944.  Typical missions included 
aerial resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration of agents, and 
exfiltration of agents, partisans, and casualties.  Aerial 
resupplies were often flown in mountainous terrain during 
unfavorable weather conditions with little illumination.  
The pilot would descent to 700 feet above the ground, slow 
his aircraft close to stalling speed, and begin to play a 
complicated game with the ground reception party regarding 
the conveyance of an authentication signal.  Often the 
signal would come in the form of a dimly lit fire or a 
flash from a pocket flashlight (Warren, 1951, p. 502).  
Detection by the Germans meant almost certain death for the 
partisans and agents.  Therefore, some of the agents and 
packages were dropped onto blind drop zones that were both 
unmanned and unmarked (Thigpen, 2001, p. 4).   
At the peak of operations in July 1944, the four 
Carpetbagger squadrons flew 397 sorties, dropped 4,680 
containers, 2,909 packages, and 1,378 bundles of leaflets; 
additionally, they inserted 62 special agents behind enemy 
lines (Warren, 1951, p. 499).  By the end of the war, they 
were credited with successfully completing 1,860 missions 
out of 2,857 attempted by delivering over 30,000 packages 
and containers and inserting over 1,000 agents into enemy-
held territory (p. 500).  It is estimated that the 
Carpetbaggers’ resupply missions maintained “about 13,500 
Maquis in south-central France” (p. 503).  For this reason, 
their successful contribution to the war effort was “to 
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keep alive the resistance movement” in France (p. 505).  
After the successful campaign over France, the 
Carbetbaggers continued flying missions into Denmark, 
Norway, and Germany itself (Thigpen, 2001, p. 4). 
In an Air University paper entitled “The Cinderella 
Front,” Paul Freeman (1997) describes a similar AAF special 
operations campaign assisting partisan and resistance 
movements in Italy and the Balkans.  The USAAF contributed 
the 62d Troop Carrier Group to a combined multinational 
unit designated as the 334th Wing (p. 21).  Flying C-47 
Dakotas, these Air Commandos conducted resupply and mass 
evacuation missions.  This special operations wing 
eventually grew into a larger unit designated the Balkan 
Air Force (BAF.)  By the end of the war, the BAF had 
delivered in excess of 16,500 tons of supplies and 
evacuated over 19,000 people using special duty aircraft.  
While historians openly debate the impact of the partisans 
on the overall war effort, the impact would have been much 
less without the support of the aerial resupply (p. 40).   
The legacy of the Air Commando, then, began with 
special air operations in the European and Mediterranean 
theaters during the Second World War.  These unconventional 
warfare campaigns supported the OSS and bolstered support 
for various resistance movements throughout Europe.  In 
Asia, a different script was unfolding.  It is there that 
the legacy of the Air Commando was cemented by the exploits 
of the 1st Commando Group in the China-Burma-India theater 
of operations. 
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3. The 1st Air Commando Group 
The 1st Air Commando Group was formed under the 
personal direction of General Henry “Hap” Arnold, 
Commanding General of the USAAF, in 1943, at the insistence 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.  At the Quebec Quadrant 
Conference in August of 1943, President Roosevelt was 
introduced to Brigadier General Orde C Wingate of the 
British Army.  Wingate outlined his plan for a renewed 
attack on the Japanese in Burma; essentially, it was a 
beefier version of Operation Longcloth which had failed, in 
part, due to a lack of air support from the Royal Air Force 
(Kelly, 1996, p. 12).  President Roosevelt enthusiastically 
supported the new plan and offered to provide air support 
to Wingate’s Chindits.  This arrangement would allow the 
AAF to “demonstrate yet another aspect of air power—the 
ability to support sizeable Army units behind enemy lines.” 
(p. 13). 
Wingate had a reputation for his prowess in the 
conduct of unconventional warfare.  He came to Asia with 
the extensive guerilla warfare experience of fighting the 
Arabs in Palestine and the Italians in Libya.  With a keen 
ability to “ignite other men,” Wingate’s plan to attack the 
Japanese in Burma centered on the employment of a raiding 
force with the ability to “operate alone far behind enemy 
lines, moving stealthily through the jungle to chip away at 
the enemy’s supply lines—and his morale.” (p. 10).  Wingate 
named his unorthodox force after a dragonlike creature of 
Burmese myths—the Chindits (p. 11). 
General Arnold selected Lieutenant Colonels Phil 
Cochran and John Alison to lead the AAF effort (code-named 
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“Project 9”) of supporting Wingate’s Chindits.  The two co-
commanders were given high level support and virtual “blank 
checks” for the formation of their composite force of 
transport, bomber, fighter, and glider aircraft.  Cochran 
and Alison assembled a force of 523 volunteers and 348 
aircraft (Haas, 1997, p. 8).  Having already coined the 
force as his “air commandos,” General Arnold’s parting 
words to Alison and Cochran were, “To hell with the 
paperwork; go out and fight” (in Kelly, 1996, p. 15). 
Alison and Cochran began training their new force on 1 
October, 1943, in North Carolina (p. 18).  The program 
focused on low-level flying with particular emphasis on 
blacked out operations at night.  The aviators attempted to 
innovate employment methods for gliders—an untested concept 
at the time for the AAF (p. 19).  The unit also adopted the 
most state-of-the-art equipment they could find such as new 
mobile hospitals, experimental rockets, alternate uniforms, 
and modified weaponry and ordnance delivery systems (Mason, 
Bergeron, and Renfrow, 1994, p. 16).  They also 
experimented with the possible combat uses of helicopters, 
although sufficient quantities were never acquired (Kelly, 
1996, p. 19).  Training was cut short in November 1943, 
when the newly formed force, now designated the 5318th 
Provisional Unit (Air), was given orders to pack up and 
ship out to India. 
The men and equipment of the 5318th Provisional Unit 
closed on two airfields, Lalaghat and Hailakandi, in the 
Assam district of the eastern India/Burma border region in 
December.  A grass strip served as the runway and the 
facilities and quarters consisted of bamboo huts.  On 29 
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December, the 5318th Provisional Unit began training with 
the Chindits.  In early January 1944, a successful glider 
operation was conducted during which 400 Chindits were 
landed near Lalitpur (p. 21).  Afterwards, however, a 
training accident produced both British and American 
casualties.  A message from Wingate’s headquarters quickly 
restored confidence: “Please be assured that we will go 
with your boys any place, any time, any where” (Mason, 
Bergeron, and Renfrow, 1994, p. 25).   
On 3 February, Cochran led a flight of P-51 Mustangs 
on the group’s first combat mission, and, on 12 February, 
the unit’s B-25 bombers flew their first combat sorties.  
Additionally, during this period, 700 British casualties 
were evacuated by the unit’s light planes from the Arakan 
front (p. 24).  In preparation for the Chindits’ big push—
Operation Thursday—the Air Commandos assembled a fleet of 
aircraft consisting of 150 troop gliders, 100 light planes, 
30 P-51 Mustangs, 12 B-25 bombers, and 13 C-47 transports 
(p. 23). 
In Defeat Into Victory, Field Marshal Viscount Slim 
(1956) recalls the guidance he gave as the commanding 
general of the British Fourteenth Army to Wingate prior to 
the launch of Operation Thursday.  Wingate’s Chindits were 
to cut the communications of the Japanese 18th Division, 
“harassing its rear, and preventing its reinforcement”, 
create a “favourable situation for the Yunnan Chinese 
forces to cross the Salween and enter Burma”, and inflict 
the “greatest possible damage and confusion on the enemy in 
North Burma.” (p. 259).  The tasks of the Air Commandos, 
therefore, were to stage the actual air invasion and 
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provide resupply, medical evacuation, and close air support 
to Wingate’s ground forces.  The intent was to avoid “the 
enormous physical toll of weeks of marching in the jungle” 
that plagued the British during Operation Longcloth (Mason, 
Bergeron, and Renfrow, 1994, p. 10).  Operation Thursday 
would complement the ongoing conventional Allied efforts of 
battling the Japanese in Burma. 
Operation Thursday was touted as “the most audacious 
single operation of the entire war in the CBI” (Haas, 1997, 
p.8).  Just after darkness on 5 March, 1944, a force of 80 
gliders carrying Chindit assault forces and their supplies 
departed India for their landing zone (designated 
“Broadway”) 200 miles behind Japanese lines in the Burmese 
jungle.  The blacked-out aerial invasion force encountered 
significant turbulence over the Chin Hills mountain range 
(Mason, Bergeron, and Renfrow, 1994, p. 29).  Decreased 
flight performance due to overweight cargo loads compounded 
the pilots’ difficulties resulting in the loss of 17 
gliders after they broke loose from their tow aircraft (p. 
31). Despite this setback, the assault force continued.  
Col Alison piloted one of the first gliders into the 
landing zone.  The landing area was rougher than expected 
resulting in much damage to the gliders.  Of the 37 gliders 
that landed at Broadway, only three were flyable.  Many 
gliders missed the landing zone altogether and crash landed 
in the jungle.  Due to the chaos, Alison broke radio 
silence and transmitted an abort message back to Cochran 
and Wingate (p. 32).  The follow-on glider sorties were 
recalled. Despite the damage, 539 Chindits and 29,972 
pounds of supplies had been successfully inserted that 
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night; casualties included 28 fatalities and 30 men 
requiring medical evacuation.  More importantly, there was 
no Japanese opposition (p. 33). 
The Japanese had been fooled by a few wayward gliders 
that experienced premature release; several of these 
gliders landed near Japanese field headquarters creating an 
unplanned diversion for the main assault force that lasted 
for over a week.  This lack of opposition allowed the 
Chindits to build a hasty runway in the jungle on their 
first day at Broadway; over 100 sorties were flown into 
Broadway on the second night, thereby allowing the entire 
assault force to close (p. 33). 
Once on the ground, Wingate’s force sought targets of 
opportunity.  The Chindits were supported by close air 
support from the Air Commandos.  On 8 March, P-51 Mustangs 
destroyed 27 Japanese fighters, seven bombers, and one 
transport on the ground.  The fighter pilots returned to 
base and then flew additional attack sorties in the unit’s 
B-25s (p. 35).  By the end of the day, the Air Commandos 
had notched up 48 enemy aircraft—a figure representing over 
40% of all Japanese aircraft destroyed in the CBI theater 
up until that time (p. 36). 
Operation Thursday concluded on 11 March.  During its 
six days and nights, the Air Commandos supported the 
Chindits’ assault by carrying 2,083 troops, 16 horses, 136 
mules, and 104,681 pounds of supplies deep into Burma (p. 
36).  The unit’s light aircraft played a crucial role by 
conducting timely medical evacuations to the remote 
stretches of jungles where the Chindits operated.  
Additionally, the Air Commandos made history by flying the 
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first helicopter combat rescue missions into Burma; a total 
of 23 sorties were flown resulting in the rescue of 18 
commandos (p. 37).  Night resupply airdrops kept the highly 
mobile Chindits with stocks of rations, ammunition, and 
other field necessities.  The first use of rockets in 
combat contributed to the advancements made in “aerial 
artillery” during close air support missions (p. 39).  
Finally, the Air Commandos supplied the Chindits with 
current battlefield intelligence and served a critical link 
in the movement of commanding officers around the 
battlefield.  Later in March, the unit received official 
designation as the 1st Air Commando Group. 
From March until May 1944, the Air Commandos 
successfully served as the “backbone” of the Chindits’ 
invasion by providing air support “from airfields 150 miles 
behind enemy lines.” (p. 41).  With monsoon rains oncoming, 
the unit saw their last action on 19 May, when they shot 
down their last two Japanese aircraft (p. 43.)  Over their 
three-month campaign, the Air Commandos delivered 2.5 
million pounds of cargo (primarily at night,) evacuated 
2,200 personnel, and destroyed 20% of all Japanese fighters 
and bombers in Burma (p. 45).  An Air Force study concluded 
that under “Cochran and Alison’s exceptional leadership, 
American air power proved that it could be ready and 
willing to meet any challenge, any place, any time, 
anywhere.” (p. 45).           
4. Post WWII through Vietnam 
The USAAF lost most of its capability to support 
unconventional warfare operations during the demobilization 
that followed the Second World War.  In 1947, the Central 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created as successor to the 
OSS which was disbanded in 1945 (Thigpen, 2001, p. 5).  In 
response to the CIA’s requirement for the long-range air 
transport of agents and supplies into Soviet-occupied 
areas, the Air Force established the Air Resupply and 
Communications Service (ACRS) in 1951.  
The ACRS “was responsible for USAF unconventional 
warfare (guerilla warfare), direct action (commando-type 
raids), strategic reconnaissance (intelligence gathering), 
and PSYWAR [psychological warfare] operations.”  Three 
wings were eventually established under the newly formed 
command; the squadrons flew specially modified B-29, C-119, 
SA-16 (amphibian), and H-19A (helicopter) aircraft (p. 7).  
Operational missions were flown in various theaters from 
forward deployed locations in Korea, Japan, Libya, the 
Philippines, Iran, and the United Kingdom.   
One noteworthy mission occurred inside Soviet airspace 
involving a SA-16 conducting a night amphibious 
exfiltration mission flown in 1956 (p. 9).  Other typical 
missions included the infiltration and resupply of agents 
behind the lines in North Korea (p. 6).  After a short 
break following the Korean conflict and classified 
employment during various Cold War dust-ups, AFSOF was 
employed en masse during the Vietnam War.  
A small detachment consisting of 151 specially trained 
AFSOF airmen and 16 extensively modified aircraft was 
deployed to Bien Hoa, South Vietnam, in November 1961, 
under the code name “Farm Gate” (Corum and Johnson, 2003, 
p. 246).  The official mission for the deployment was to 
train South Vietnamese pilots; however, the aircrews soon 
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found themselves flying their aircraft in combat (Chinnery, 
1994, p. 69).  In fact, Farm Gate, a detachment from the 
4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) at Hurlburt 
Field, Florida, became the first Air Force unit to conduct 
combat operations in Vietnam (Haas, 1994, p. 43).  
“Jungle Jim” was the code name given to the 4400th 
CCTS. The unit was activated in April 1961, as the USAF’s 
response to President Kennedy’s call for the creation of a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) capability to deal with the 
numerous wars of liberation of the 1960s.  The initial 
cadre included 352 officers and enlisted men as well as 32 
specially modified propeller-driven aircraft; the aircraft 
inventory included C-47s, B-26s, and T-28s (p. 42).  The 
mission of the unit was to “fly operations against 
guerillas, either as an overt Air Force operation or in an 
undefined covert capacity” (Chinnery, 1994, p. 67).  After 
an initial deployment to West Africa, the Air Commandos of 
the Jungle Jim program soon found themselves in Vietnam (p. 
68).   
In response to the escalation of the war in Vietnam, 
Jungle Jim’s Farm Gate detachment found itself in high 
demand.  Soon after its arrival in country, Farm Gate was 
permitted to engage in direct attacks on the Viet Cong so 
long as a South Vietnamese observer was onboard each of its 
aircraft.  These rules eventually became more relaxed as 
the Air Commandos trained the Vietnamese in the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures necessary for conducting close 
air support, interdiction, airlift, evacuation, and 
reconnaissance missions (Corum and Johnson, 2003, p. 246).   
 37
As the demand for a larger South Vietnamese air force 
grew, so did the demand for more Farm Gate volunteers.  As 
a result, the Air Staff doubled the size of the 4400th CCTS 
to include authorizations for 790 personnel and 64 
aircraft.  The unit was re-designated the 1st Air Commando 
Group.  In April 1962, the group changed names to the 
Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) and authorizations 
increased to 860 personnel and 82 aircraft (p. 247).  The 
increased strength of the SAWC allowed the unit to provide 
the Farm Gate detachment with more resources thereby 
enhancing combat effectiveness. 
By the end of 1962, the Air Commandos of the Farm Gate 
detachment had tallied an impressive score by successfully 
completing 4,040 flights in support of the Government of 
South Vietnam.  During one week in November, crews 
airdropped 9,000 pounds and air landed 7,000 pounds of 
supplies during the execution of 70 combat support 
missions.  During an interdiction mission on 23 November, 
one aircrew alone was credited with destroying a munitions 
factory and 26 boats while producing 281 enemy casualties.  
By the new year, the detachment was credited with expending 
over 500,000 items of ordnance resulting in 3,381 enemy 
casualties and the damage or destruction of 4,151 
structures and 405 boats (Chinnery, 1994, p. 72). 
Furthermore, Farm Gate aircrews were attributed with 
producing 38% of Viet Cong casualties during the first 
eight months of 1963 (Corum and Johnson, 2003, p. 250).  
The success of Farm Gate, coupled with the escalation of 
the overall American effort, resulted in the expansion of 
AFSOF’s participation in Vietnam. 
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Air Commandos of the Special Aerial Spray Flight and 
the 12th Air Commando Squadron (ACS) led the aerial 
defoliation effort known as Operation Ranch Hand (Chinnery, 
1994, p. 73).  Using C-123 Provider cargo aircraft 
specially modified with the MC-1 Hourglass spray system, 
aerial spray missions commenced on 13 January, 1962 (Corum 
and Johnson, 2003, p. 255).  In May 1962, it was reported 
that “of twenty-one areas sprayed, air-to-ground visibility 
had improved by 70 percent and ground visibility by 60 
percent” and that “defoliation had prompted the surrender 
of 112 Viet Cong guerillas who had been frightened by the 
chemical spraying” (p. 256).  Despite its anecdotal 
success, Operation Ranch Hand was eventually terminated due 
to immense controversies and opposition from the State 
Department. 
Besides aerial defoliation, other unique mission sets 
matured during AFSOF’s experience in Vietnam including the 
use of helicopters for rapid infiltration, exfiltration, 
and combat search and rescue missions, fixed-wing aircraft 
for the aerial refueling of helicopters, and aircraft 
specially modified for use in psychological operations. 
These capabilities were demonstrated during the execution 
of Operation Kingpin on 21 November, 1970.  This well-known 
raid on the abandoned Son Tay prison, 23 miles outside of 
Hanoi, was flown by Air Commandos in MC-130E, HC-130P, HH-
3, HH-53, and A-1E aircraft (Gargus, 2007, p. 269).  
Although the mission failed to bring prisoners of war 
(POWs) home, it succeeded by sending a “powerful message to 
the whole world” and resulted in the consolidation of POWs 
in Hanoi thereby boosting morale and strengthening the will 
of American captives (p. 264).   
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Other specially selected AF pilots joined the ranks of 
the “Ravens” of the Steve Canyon program.  These men flew 
light aircraft for the CIA in support of the secret war in 
Laos while being administratively assigned to the 56th 
Special operations Wing in Thailand (Robbins, 1987, p. 31).  
These men “fought with obsolete propeller aircraft, the 
discarded junk of an earlier era, and suffered the highest 
casualty rate of the Indochinese War.”  Their mission was 
to “fly as the winged artillery of some fearsome warload, 
who led an army of stone-age mercenaries in the pay of the 
CIA” (p. 1).  No development had more of an impact on 
AFSOF, however, than the evolution of the aerial gunships. 
The first AC-47 Gunship entered service with the Air 
Commandos in 1965.  Under the code name Operation Sixteen 
Buck, a fleet of 20 AC-47s was assigned to the 4th Air 
Commando Squadron.  Given the call sign “Spooky,” these 
devastating machines used their side-firing miniguns to 
“respond with flares and firepower in support of hamlets 
under night attack, supplement strike aircraft in the 
defence of friendly forces and provide long endurance 
support for convoys” (Chinnery, 1994, p. 99).  Eventually, 
two Spooky squadrons were activated before the AC-47’s 
replacement by the more advanced AC-119 and AC-130 
gunships.  By the time of their retirement, AC-47 gunships 
had defended over 6,000 hamlets; in the first six months of 
1969 alone they were credited with killing 1,473 enemy 
personnel (p. 103). Fueled in part by the evolution of the 
gunship, AFSOF experienced tremendous expansion during the 
Vietnam War. 
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The 1st Air Commando Group expanded to wing status in 
May 1963 (Haas, 1994, p. 44).  In March 1964, AFSOF veteran 
Colonel Harry “Heinie” Aderholt, affectionately known as 
“Air Commando One,” took command of the 1st Air Commando 
Wing (Trest, 2000, p. 134).  The leadership of Heinie 
Aderholt will be examined further in Chapter V, but by 
October 1965, the re-designated 1st Air Commando Wing had 
acquired an inventory of 117 aircraft.  The expansion of 
AFSOF increased the training requirement of the SAWC to an 
annual rate of 1800 maintenance personnel and 1285 aircrew 
(Chinnery, 1994, p. 124).   
The Air Commando units in Vietnam ultimately expanded 
their fleets to include O-1, A-1E, U-10, C-47, AC-47, CH-
3C, AC-119, A-37, MC-130, and AC-130 aircraft.  The mission 
sets of the Air Commandos included aerial resupply, combat 
airlift, close air support, photographic reconnaissance, 
interdiction, search and rescue, psychological warfare, 
flare drops, and forward air control (p. 125).  At the 
height of the effort in Vietnam, AFSOF had grown to 19 
flying squadrons with 550 assigned aircraft.  In a similar 
trend to previous wars, demobilization efforts at the end 
of hostilities resulted in an AFSOF inventory of a mere 40 
aircraft by 1974 (Corum and Johnson, 2003, p. 273).   
AFSOF experienced a period of transition over the 
course of the two decades following the demobilization 
after the Vietnam War.  The period is generally 
characterized by Susan Marquis (1997) as indicative of the 
“U. S. Air Force’s long history of ignoring SOF.”  The 
beginning of this transition period, therefore, serves as a  
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logical break point in delineating the end of the 
historical Air Commando era and the beginning of modern 
AFSOF.  
This section described the heritage of the Air 
Commandos.  Without an appreciation for the context of 
their operating environment, it is difficult to assess the 
culture of an historical organization. The following 
section, therefore, builds upon that heritage by applying 
the cultural framework introduced in Chapter II. 
B. APPLICATION OF THE CULTURAL FRAMEWORK 
1. What is the Background of the Leaders? 
The previous chapter explained the absolute importance 
of leadership in the shaping of organizational culture.  In 
fact, Sathe’s first question in deciphering organizational 
culture is “What is the background of the founders and 
others who followed them?”  This section will explore that 
question by focusing on three well-known leaders from the 
Air Commando heritage:  Phil Cochran, John Alison, and 
Heinie Aderholt.    
a. Phil Cochran and John Alison 
At the time of their selection as co-commanders 
of Project 9, Lieutenant Colonels Phil Cochran and John 
Alison had extensive experience as fighter pilots.  Both 
men flew the P-40 Warhawk.  While they had been roommates 
during previous stateside assignments, their combat 
experience occurred in different theaters.   
Cochran’s seasoning occurred in North Africa 
where he achieved aerial combat victories against the 
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Germans.  He was renowned for his “initiative and 
imaginative use of air power.”  These qualities served him 
well in developing new tactics to counter the Germans.  For 
his exploits in North Africa, he was awarded the Silver 
Star and the Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf 
clusters (Mason, Bergeron, and Renfrow, 1994, p. 9).  
Alison’s previous war time achievement was also 
impressive.  Prior to his interview with General Arnold, he 
had already become a fighter ace by tallying seven aerial 
victories while fighting the Japanese in China.  He was 
most notably known and “respected for his leadership and 
strong organizational skills.”  More importantly, he 
brought to his new posting useful knowledge from his past 
experience in the CBI theater of operations regarding 
Japanese equipment and tactics (p. 9).   
Cochran and Alison both grew up in middle class, 
working families.  Born in Erie, Pennsylvania, Cochran 
graduated from Ohio State University in 1935 (Boltz, 2001, 
p. 24).  It was during his Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(ROTC) classes in Columbus where “his life-long habit of 
paying little attention to military appearance standards 
and formality began.” (p. 25).  After working his way 
through school, Cochran diligently pursued acceptance into 
the Army Air Corps cadet flying school program.  
It was during initial flight training at Randolph 
Field, Texas, that Cochran first met John Alison.  Alison 
was born to the son of a logger in Micanopy, Florida, on 21 
November, 1912 (p. 41).  Although diminutive in stature, he 
excelled at both academics and athletics.  He attended the 
University of Florida in Gainesville where he graduated in 
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1935 with a degree in Industrial Engineering (p. 43).  When 
they first met, Cochran, an upperclassman in the flying 
program, served as a mentor to Alison, an underclassman.   
Alison’s interactions with Cochran during flight 
training and the subsequent encounters between the two 
highlight one of Cochran’s most enduring trademarks—“his 
desire and ability to teach.”  Later in life, Cochran 
reflected on a personal trait of his that “makes me want to 
tell the other fellow what I have learned.  I can’t stand 
to see somebody who wants to know something that I know, 
and not give it to him.” (in Boltz, 2001, p. 47).  After 
graduation, Alison followed Cochran to Langley Field, 
Virginia, where the two flew P-40 Warhawk fighters. 
After their initial assignment to Langley, 
Cochran and Alison traveled separate paths prior to their 
reunion as co-commanders of the 1st Air Commando Group.  
Despite this, their interim exploits reveal several 
behavioral traits that help define the two.  In turn, these 
traits form their leadership styles and help answer Sathe’s 
first question. 
Cochran cut his teeth in the North African 
theater of operations serving as the squadron commander of 
various pursuit (fighter) squadrons fighting against the 
Germans.  Wholeheartedly believing that the best way to 
improve his pilots’ performance was to train them the way 
they would fight, Cochran implemented innovative and 
thorough training programs in the units he commanded (p. 
28).  These initiatives served as the benchmark for the 
training programs adopted by the Northwest African Training 
Command and later the First Air Force (p. 40).  Cochran’s 
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intensity resulted in medically diagnosed “cumulative 
fatigue” that required extensive treatment; it also 
underscores another trait of his—intense devotion to his 
men. 
Throughout his career, Cochran pushed himself to 
the limit out of concern for the well-being of the men 
under his command (p. 37).  In that manner, he never failed 
to sing the accolades of those who worked for him.  Once, 
after a key victory in the campaign, Cochran commented, 
“our people, our boys and pilots, are wonderful.  Without 
the spirit of the ‘plain American guy’ you couldn’t have 
done it.  It would be just impossible.” (in Boltz, 2001, p. 
38).  After he returned to the States, Cochran’s passion 
for his people continued:   
Not only did he get to know the pilots and their 
families, but he also drank beer at night with 
them—all the while talking to them about what 
they were doing right and wrong.  Cochran sensed 
their eagerness to learn and did all he could to 
satisfy their appetite. (p. 40)  
Cochran’s achievements in North Africa reveal 
more than just his ability to lead by example.  Perhaps 
most importantly, the campaign revealed his superior 
judgment and “ability to read a situation, determine what 
adjustments were necessary and make the necessary changes—
even if it meant things were not done ‘by the book.” (p. 
35).  Out of necessity and in exchange for increased combat 
effectiveness, Cochran disregarded what the book said when 
it came to living conditions and grooming standards.  
Putting his men and equipment in a position to take the 
fight to the Germans meant that they couldn’t live in the 
“most luxurious of living conditions” (p. 34). Operating 
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from pup tents and living quarters dug into the sides of 
ravines ensured that Cochrane received little supervision. 
More importantly, it set the conditions so he could 
demonstrate his stellar initiative and technical competence 
by creating new concepts for close air support and aerial 
interdiction (p. 36).  The resulting success caught the 
attention of his commanding generals and paved the way for 
his reunion with John Alison. 
Like Phil Cochran, Alison was well known for his 
technical competence; reports suggest that “Alison’s flying 
skills are legendary.” (p. 41).  His combination of 
academic and practical experience paid off during his 
nearly three-year journey across Europe and Asia with the 
Lend-Lease program (p. 48).  Without the assistance of 
technical manuals or interpreters, Alison taught English, 
Russian, and Persian pilots how to fly the P-40, A-20, and 
B-25 aircraft (p. 54).  His experience, coupled with his 
“gentlemanly way,” built an appreciation for cultural 
sensitivity and coalition warfare (p. 59).  Working with 
small teams or often alone, his Lend-Lease program taught 
him to be independent and allowed him the opportunity to 
exercise and display sound judgment (p. 51).   
Alison’s successful display didn’t go unnoticed, 
and he was sent to China in 1942 where he was given command 
of the 75th Fighter Squadron of the famed 23rd Fighter 
Group’s “Flying Tigers.”  In becoming an ace, he cemented 
his reputation as a strong, highly competent leader by 
knowing the capabilities of his pilots and being “right 
beside them during the tough situations.” (p. 58).  Like 
Cochrane, he was innovative, particularly in formulating 
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night fighting techniques against the Japanese (p. 59).  
His success led to a promotion and command of the 367th 
Fighter Group (p. 60).   
Several personal qualities emerge after reviewing 
Alison and Cochran’s successes as fighter squadron 
commanders and as co-commanders of the 1st Air Commando 
Group. Both men demonstrated a keen sense of vision, 
practiced good communications skills, had an ability and 
desire to teach, upheld the highest level of integrity, and 
led by example “from the front.”  Furthermore, each one 
showed deep care for the well-being and development of 
their subordinates, exhibited the highest levels of 
technical competence, and proved adaptive, flexible, and 
innovative (p. 106).  Likewise, Brigadier General Heinie 
Aderholt, commander of the Air Commandos in Vietnam, 
demonstrated many of these same qualities.  
b. Heinie Aderholt 
Brigadier General Harry C. “Heinie” Aderholt was 
born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1920 (United States Air 
Force, 1975).  His father, a railroad fireman, perished in 
a train crash when Heinie was nine years old.  For the rest 
of his adolescence, he helped his mother and six siblings 
support the family.  It was during these formative years 
that he learned his family’s “traits of pride, loyalty, and 
tenacity” that provided the cornerstone for his military 
successes (Trest, 2000, p. 2). 
Aderholt joined the Army Air Corps during the 
Second World War and flew B-17s and C-47s in North Africa 
and Italy (p. 5).  Upon returning home from the war and 
completing instructor pilot training, he was assigned to 
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Maxwell Field, Alabama, where he served as a staff pilot 
for the Army Air Forces Eastern Flying Training Command.  
It was at Maxwell where he “found a home” in the Air Force 
upon its birth in 1947 (p. 5).  It is there that he met and 
married his wife.  
Aderholt also served as the commanding officer of 
a segregated black squadron at Maxwell.  Under his command, 
the squadron flourished; the men’s accomplishments served 
as a “source of great pride and satisfaction” throughout 
his military career. It was during his time at Maxwell that 
he “really learned more there about leadership and about 
people’ than at any other time in his career.” (p. 19).   
Heinie Aderholt left Maxwell to fly C-47s in the 
Korean War.  He commanded the Special Air Warfare 
Detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron from July 
1950, until September 1951 (United States Air Force, 1975).  
In that capacity, he served as “point man” for covert air 
operations in Korea.  He made a lasting impact on the 
development of clandestine air warfare tactics, techniques, 
and procedures through the success of his audacious and 
“in-your-face” secret missions over the denied territory of 
North Korea.   
Heinie’s experiences in Korea cemented his belief 
that his place as a leader was “in the cockpit and out 
there on the flight line with the men, leading them, 
working with them, and caring for them” (Trest, 2000, p. 
50).  Aderholt’s selfless dedication and “guts, 
perseverance, and ingenuity had sustained UNC [United 
Nations Command] clandestine air operations when conditions 
were at their worst in the war.” (p. 51).  His impressive 
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service drew the attention of officials at the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) who offered him an assignment at 
the Air Force’s detachment to the organization (p. 52). 
Upon his return to the States, Aderholt was 
assigned to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group in 
Washington, DC (United States Air Force, 1975).  As part of 
the organization, he was on loan to the CIA’s Air Training 
Branch.  Aderholt was charged with establishing and 
operating a clandestine air training program at Camp Perry 
(Trest, 2000, p. 55).  After eighteen months in the 
training business, Heinie itched for a return to 
operations.  With the Korean conflict winding down, 
however, he spent the next few years hopping between 
assignments in South Carolina and Germany before returning 
to Washington in 1957 as a special warfare staff officer 
(United States Air Force, 1975). 
Aderholt returned to the 1007th Air Intelligence 
Service Group (renamed the 1040th USAF Field Activity 
Squadron in 1959) in the fall of 1957 (Trest, 2000, p. 75).  
For the next two-and-a-half years, he worked at CIA 
headquarters “developing and testing special light aircraft 
for covert operations, formulating tactics and training 
requirements for aircrews flying secret missions, and 
developing plans for tactical air support of paramilitary 
actions” (p. 74).  Heinie’s work at the agency was so 
impressive that he garnered the favor of Richard Bissell, 
the head of the CIA’s covert operations.  Bissell stated 
that Aderholt “was an outstanding officer who had ‘handled 
and accomplished projects on his own,’ which normally 
required the work of a whole team of officers.” (p. 78).  
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It was natural, therefore, that Aderholt became the go-to 
man when something needed to be fixed.  In 1960, Aderholt 
was sent to rehabilitate the agency’s detachment on 
Okinawa. 
Aderholt was assigned to Okinawa in January, 
1960, where he commanded the 1095th Operational Evaluation 
Training Group (United States Air Force, 1975).  Taking 
over a lackluster operation, Heinie quickly shook things up 
by firing the “troublemakers and deadwood” and 
reinvigorating the personnel who stayed (Trest, 2000, p. 
85).  Using C-118 and C-130 aircraft and a forward 
operating location in Takhli, Thailand, Aderholt commanded 
the Tibetan airlift during which the CIA supported the 
armed resistance movement against the Chinese Communist 
forces that had invaded the country (p. 91).  As this 
mission wound down, the unit shifted focus to protecting 
U.S. interests in neighboring Laos (p. 98).   
It is during this new tasking that “he 
contributed to the pioneering of special air warfare 
techniques, and was instrumental in developing the Laos 
airfield complex known as Lima sites.” (United States Air 
Force, 1975).  Living in austere conditions in remote 
areas, he used his “incredible energy and staying power” to 
inspire his men to give more than they thought possible 
(Trest, 2000, p. 103).  Heinie’s experience in Asia and 
with the CIA had given him enviable expertise in irregular 
warfare.  This expertise was in high demand as the conflict 




found himself with transfer orders to the Special Air 
Warfare Center (SAWC) at Eglin AFB, Florida, in August 1962 
(p. 124).  
Although the SAWC had been in existence for a 
couple of years prior to his arrival, Aderholt was credited 
with “getting the Air Commandos and special air warfare 
moving in the right direction.” When it came to special 
operations, Heinie “fought tirelessly for the right people, 
planes, and equipment to carry the mission out.”   
Specifically, he was noted for a “can-do” attitude and his 
unique ability of coordinating and selling special air 
warfare capabilities to Army Special Forces thereby 
“helping to develop special air warfare doctrine and 
procedures throughout the defense department.” (p. 131).  
As the “patriarch of special operations in Southeast Asia. 
. . .Aderholt was ‘the only one who had any concept of what 
we should be doing.” (p. 130-131).   
Aderholt formalized his reputation as “Air 
Commando One” over the course of his next few assignments 
from 1964 to 1968.  In March 1964, he assumed command of 
the 1st Air Commando Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida.  He 
boosted the espirit-de-corps and morale of the unit; as one 
officer noted, his troops “would follow him any place, any 
time.” (p. 134).   
Following his tenure as wing commander, Aderholt 
was sent to Clark Air Base in the Philippines where he 
served as deputy commander of the 6200th Materiel Wing 
(United States Air Force, 1975).  He quickly made a name 
for himself at Clark by implementing an innovative program 
that put a stop to the excessive levels of crime that had 
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plagued the base (Trest, 2000, p. 160).  He also set a new 
benchmark for the support function in that he “was always 
there for the men in combat and always had a helping hand 
for those in need.” (p. 166).  
While stationed at Clark, Aderholt was selected 
for temporary duty with the Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam, where he set up and commanded the Joint Personnel 
Recovery Center (United States Air Force, 1975).  In 
navigating the uncharted territory of personnel recovery, 
the new organization encountered numerous “problems without 
precedents they could turn to for answers.”  As one 
subordinate officer noted, Aderholt “had the uncanny 
ability of getting people involved to the extent they were 
eager to get back on the job even whey they were exhausted.  
‘He convinced you that you could make things happen” 
(Trest, 2000, p. 171).  
Following his work with the JPRC, Aderholt was 
sent to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, where he stood up the 56th 
Air Commando Wing in April 1967 (p. 182).  Exhibiting 
“dynamic and fearless leadership” Heinie consolidated the 
special air warfare units in Thailand under his command 
despite a lack of personnel and poor facilities (p. 183).  
Using prop-driven aircraft, the new wing conducted low-
level night interdiction missions in the skies over Laos 
and North Vietnam; the wing experienced unparalleled 
success in slowing the infiltration of the enemy along the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail (United States Air Force, 1975).   
A fellow colonel in the 56th Air Commando Wing 
noted that “Aderholt flaunted ‘a shameless disregard for 
his own career by attacking incorrect principles and 
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actions taken by his senior officers.”  The colonel also 
reported that “Aderholt’s superior leadership inspired 
everyone in his command to accomplish feats ‘even they 
themselves thought impossible” (Trest, 2000, p. 184).  Such 
sentiments were commonplace for those who served under 
Aderholt throughout his lengthy career.  
Many themes emerge when considering the 
leadership of Brigadier General Heinie Aderholt over his 
four decades of uniformed service.  His official 
performance reports include descriptions such as “stong-
minded,” “extremely frank,” “intensely devoted to duty,” 
and “strong courage in his convictions.” Personal accounts 
suggest that he had “great bureaucratic courage,” “a huge, 
compassionate heart,” and was “utterly frank and frugal” 
(p. 77).  Subordinates report that Heinie was “spring-
loaded with energy” and seemed to be “everywhere at once.”  
A “go-getter,” he “took a special interest in the younger 
officers and gave them room to grow.” (p. 86).  
Furthermore, “In his drive to get things done, Aderholt 
never let hurdles like regulations or protocol stand in his 
way.” (p. 107).   
In examining Heinie’s relationship with his 
aircrews, he never asked them “to fly missions that he 
would not fly himself.”  When off-duty, he made it a point 
to visit the officer and NCO clubs in order to drink and 
socialize with his men; he emphasized that such time 
honored rituals “played extremely important roles in esprit 




The following section investigates the characteristics of 
the men that legends such as Aderholt, Cochran, and Alison 
commanded. 
c. The Followers 
The Air Commandos described earlier in this 
chapter clearly had the imprint of their leaders stamped 
upon them.  Most of the characteristics and personal 
attributes provided in the descriptions of Alison, Cochran, 
and Aderholt were assumed by their men as well.  These men, 
however, had several characteristics that separated them 
from their peers in non-special operations units. 
The most obvious characteristic of the first Air 
Commandos is that they were all volunteers.  Not everyone 
could join the ranks of these special units because of the 
special authority regarding the selection and retention of 
personnel that was given to the early commanders.  In more 
recent years, the personnel system has merely assigned 
aircrew members to AFSOF units.  This was not a common 
occurrence in the Air Commandos because “in the early days 
you had to volunteer or be invited to join” (Chinnery, 
1994, p. 78).   
Even when they were invited to join, recruits 
often went through a screening or evaluation process.  For 
example, Alison and Cochran developed a screening process 
to ensure the force accepted “no castoffs from other units, 
no ‘trouble makers’” (Y’Blood, 2001, p. 8).  By carefully 
selecting personnel, leaders were able to provide their 
subordinates with increased discretion when it came to 
rules compliance in the unit’s austere operating 
environment (such conditions weren’t always conducive for 
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strict adherence to regulations.) Additionally, Alison and 
Cochran could also ensure they accepted volunteers that 
“possessed more than one skill.”   
The 1st Air Commando Group was also able to 
create a “lean, self-sufficient force” of the “highest 
caliber people.” (Mason, Bergeron, and Renfrow, 1994, 11).  
According to Aderholt, “every commando ‘pulled more than 
his own weight”.  Cooks and medics assisted with the 
movement of aircraft around the field while every member of 
the Air Commando force was able to use radios and call in 
air strikes if required.  One member recounted that, “I had 
a dozen jobs I could do, and there was no saying that you 
couldn’t do a certain thing.” (in Bailey, 1997, 11).  
The Carpetbaggers were selected in a similar 
manner whereby their recruitment depended upon “their 
backgrounds, characters, and military records” (Parnell, 
1987, p. 21).  An Air Commando from the Farm Gate era 
recalls being “evaluated and tested” by a “psychiatrist” as 
well as going through other physical and mental assessment 
exercises (Chinnery, 1994, p. 79).  Such evaluations often 
served as a prerequisite for entry into the classified 
programs of Air Commando units.   
The clandestine and covert nature of many Air 
Commando missions brought about a requirement for 
sensitivity and secrecy among many of the units.  “The 
secrecy in which they operated” meant that the Air 
Commandos often “took on a certain character which set them 
apart from the usual combat units”(Parnell, 1987, p. 20). 
This character manifested in zeal for the “unknown, the 
untested, the unusual” (Y’Blood, 2001, p. 9).  A byproduct 
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of being part of something “special,” the early Air 
Commando units often exhibited a higher degree of esprit de 
corps and morale. 
The Air Commandos had a tight esprit de corps 
that developed from being part of an elite unit.  Their 
intense training, specialized aircraft (often vintage, not 
the most technologically advanced,) and shared experiences 
all contributed to its development.  This unique sense of 
esprit de corps often manifested in debauchery at bars and 
officer’s clubs across their respective theaters of 
operations.  Christopher Robbins (1987) suggests that Air 
Commandos were at home in establishments where “The 
clientele was exotic and somewhat rowdy.” (p. 28).  As 
Heinie Aderholt attests, “The enthusiasm with which they 
flew was the enthusiasm with which they drank” (in Trest, 
2000, p. 136).  The high morale of the Air Commandos often 
manifested in relaxed “standards of military discipline and 
appearance” as well (Mason, Bergeron, Renfrow, 1994, p. 
18).  
In preparing the 1st Air Commando Group for war, 
Cochran and Alison authorized their men to wear non-
standard uniform items, including airborne troop uniforms 
and Marine Corps footwear.  These modified uniform 
configurations made it easier for the men to work 
efficiently in austere operating environments even though 
they were not in compliance with regulations (p. 16).   The 
men also wore beards; one visitor commented that “no two 




beards” (Y’Blood, 2001, p. 11).  This solicited a witty 
directive from Cochran to his men that is quite telling of 
life in the Air Commandos:   
Look, Sports, the beards and attempts at beards 
are not appreciated by visitors.  Since we can’t 
explain to all strangers that the fuzz is a gag 
or ‘something I always wanted to do’ affair, we 
must avoid their reporting that we are unshaven 
(regulations say you must shave) by appearing 
like Saturday night in Jersey whenever possible.  
Work comes before shaving.  You will never be 
criticized for being unkempt if you are so damn 
busy you can’t take time to doll up.  But be 
clean while you can.  Ain’t it awful? (in 
Y’Blood, 2001, p. 12) 
The Air Commandos of the Vietnam-era adopted 
alternative standards for dress and personal appearance as 
well.  In this instance, however, they acquired official 
permission for the unique uniform.  The distinctive uniform 
featured an Australian-style bush hat, jump boots, and 
bloused green fatigues complete with a blue scarf.  The 
combination was approved on the “basis of the hat’s 
operational value and boost to morale” (Trest, 2000, p. 
129).  Similarly, some men assigned to the 56th Air 
Commando Wing wore “a T-shirt, jeans, and flying boots” 
while conducting their sensitive missions in Laos (Robbins, 
1987, p. 29).   Relaxed standards of appearance resulted 
from “The realities of the battlefield [that] demanded 
again and again that the rules be broken.” (p. 19).   
Earlier accounts of Alison and Cochran described 
the 1st Air Commando Group’s disdain for rules; the tight 
operating schedule for the force’s training, equipping, and 
employment made rule-following problematic.  Perhaps some 
of the most disliked rules during the Vietnam conflict were 
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the Rules of Engagement (ROE.)  Often illogical and open to 
multiple interpretations, Air Commandos were sometimes left 
with the unenviable choice of “doing a really poor job or 
breaking the rules.” (p. 18).  As a result, the Air 
Commandos “never let hurdles like regulations or protocol” 
stand in their way (Trest, 2000, p. 107).  In this manner, 
they seized opportunities to take full advantage of 
innovations in equipment, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures.  
2. How Did the Organization Respond to Crises? 
Chapter II revealed that culture evolves as a result 
of how an organization deals with stressful periods; the 
investigation of these critical periods can help identify 
how basic assumptions were formed.  The Air Commandos best 
responded to crises in a proactive manner. Since most of 
the written accounts of the Air Commandos were recorded 
documents about their exploits during times of conflict, 
much of their documented history indeed describes their 
response to crises and has been presented earlier in this 
study.  This section, therefore, will highlight a few 
historical examples to reinforce how the Air Commandos 
responded to crises. 
The story of the 1st Air Commando Group during the 
Second World War provides numerous examples of how the 
organization responded to crises through innovation, 
improvisation, and adaptation.  Cochran and Alison were 
required to improvise with recruiting, organizing, and 




original mandate and imposed timeline simply did not 
provide the luxury of complying with established 
procedures.    
The visionary leadership of Cochran and Alison 
provided direction to the Air Commandos when rules could 
not.  The two men were able to negotiate excessive 
bureaucracy and the “battle of ideas” by effectively 
“Cutting across parochial lines” and taking full advantage 
of the diversity it produced; in this manner, they were 
able to create a “fully integrated and self-contained 
fighting unit” while confronting the crises of limited time 
and political infighting (Torres, 1997, p. 13).  
Furthermore, by “Throwing the rule book aside, they 
improvised tactics and modified aircraft on the spot, 
relying on their hand-picked, highly trained, and motivated 
personnel to overcome difficulties.” (Alnwick, 1984).    
The 1st Air Commando Group overcame the crisis 
resulting from their reduced strength and minimum resources 
through flexibility.  Colonel Alnwick (1984) states that 
the unit’s “ratio of maintenance men to aircraft is unheard 
of in most modern air forces; the difference was due to the 
careful selection of personnel from among highly talented 
volunteers.”  The group’s leadership encouraged and 
sometimes demanded that their maintenance personnel were 
capable of performing more skill sets than their particular 
specialization required.  Likewise, pilots were checked out 
in every type of the unit’s aircraft.     
Adaptive and innovative equipment, tactics, and 
procedures allowed the Air Commandos to suceed in a hostile 
jungle environment where their British predecessors had 
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failed.  Specifically, the unit had to confront the crisis 
of delivering large quantities of heavy and oversized 
equipment to austere jungle locations to a mobile force of 
commandos.  Aerial delivery techniques of the day were not 
yet advanced to the point of being able to accomplish the 
feat.  Similarly, the “dense and inhospitable” jungle was 
not initially accessible to large equipment-laden transport 
aircraft.  The Chindits, however, could not be successful 
in their mission unless they were inserted and resupplied 
in such terrain.  The Air Commandos confronted the crisis 
by adopting gliders as a means to fly in the large 
quantities of heavy equipment and personnel (Torres, 1997, 
p. 13).  Other innovations pioneered by the Air Commandos 
included the use of combat search and rescue helicopters 
and various advancements in munitions and their delivery.  
Their innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures proved 
useful to the Army Air Corps later in the war during the 
invasion of Normandy.   
In the European Theater, the Carpetbaggers confronted 
crises with a similar zeal for innovation and adaptation.  
Responding to the dire need for reinforcing resistance 
movements deep within enemy-held territory, the 
Carpetbaggers produced non-standard variants of typical AAF 
aircraft by using existing technology to make adaptations.  
These Air Commandos then pioneered and implemented 
innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures to fully 
exploit the capabilities of their unique aircraft.  
Examples include the advanced development of night, black-
out low level techniques and aerial delivery procedures to 
blind drop zones.   
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Like their counterparts in the CBI Theater, the 
Carpetbaggers addressed the crises of under manning and the 
inherent danger in their high risk missions by ensuring 
that all men were well versed at performing tasks outside 
of their primary specialty.  Ben Parnell (1987) states that 
each man was “competent in at least two positions as a crew 
member of the airplane.” (p. 21).  Such characteristics 
were not unique to the Air Commandos of the Second World 
War, but were rather representative of a trend that 
continued during Vietnam.  
The exploits of Heinie Aderholt and the Air Commandos 
of the Vietnam era provide a vivid illustration of the 
organization’s unique response style to crisis events.  
Aderholt’s response was typically bold and forceful with 
that of his subordinates being characterized by unfailing 
devotion to the orders of their leaders.  More importantly, 
Aderholt and his fellow commanders confronted crises by 
leading from the front.   
During his tenure as commander of the 56th Air 
Commando Wing, the runway and ramps at Nakhon Phanom had 
became severely fouled with rocks and shavings from the 
pierced steel planking runway.  As a result of ingesting 
these foreign objects through their prop arcs, the wing’s 
aircraft experienced undue damage to their propellers 
creating a crisis that endangered the unit’s aircrew and 
ramp personnel.  As opposed to issuing passive safety 
guidelines, Aderholt confronted the problem directly by 
ordering all personnel to the ramp one Sunday morning.  
Demonstrating their sincere commitment to every facet of 
the Air Commando mission, Aderholt and his junior 
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commanders inspired their troops by leading the 4,000 Air 
Commandos on a “FOD walk” to pick up the unwelcomed rocks 
and debris.  Of course, the refreshments in the form of 
beer he provided to the participants reinforced morale in 
the troops and made the entire spectacle even more 
memorable (Trest, 2000, p. 187).   
One way the Air Commandos alleviated the personal 
stress caused by never ending crises was through frequent 
participation in morale-boosting activities at the clubs 
and bars on the various bases.  While wing commander, 
Aderholt ordered the club to stay open 24 hours a day in 
order to accommodate personnel who worked during the 
establishment’s normal operating hours.  He believed that 
drinking and socializing in clubs “played extremely 
important roles in esprit de corps and camaraderie among 
the air commandos” (in Trest, 2000, p. 136).     
While some of the best known drinking stories emanate 
from the Vietnam era, members of the 1st Air Commando Group 
of the Second World War (including their leader, Phil 
Cochran) were reported to have engaged in similar exploits.  
In fact, his counterpart Alison attempted to protect one of 
his pilots who had a ground accident after flying while 
inebriated (Boltz, 2001, p. 100).  The Carpetbaggers 
organized similar activities as well, albeit in the very 
different social environment of wartime England.   
By most accounts, the men seldom “crossed over the 
threshold of military courtesy in the free moments of 
socializing” (Trest, 2000, p. 154).  In return, the leaders 
were able to invigorate “contagious enthusiasm and 
dedication” in the men so that they may better overcome the 
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challenges of the crises they faced (p. 149).  By providing 
visionary leadership from the front, the leadership 
empowered the men to overcome crises that “even they 
themselves thought impossible.” (p. 184).  Realizing the 
emphasis the Air Commandos put on the human component of 
military service helps answer Sathe’s question regarding 
who is considered deviant in the culture.   
3. Who are Considered Deviant in the Culture? 
In the world of military culture, deviance is often 
attributed to personnel that reside outside the dominant 
subculture.  In this regard, Air Commandos themselves were 
deviant to the dominant conventionally-minded culture of 
the Army Air Corps and Air Force.  Carl Builder describes 
such relationships when he introduces the concept of 
“altars of worship.”  
Builder (1989) defines an altar of worship as the 
principle that a military service reveres and cherishes the 
most (p. 18).  He suggests that “The Air Force could be 
said to worship at the altar of technology.  The airplane 
was the instrument that gave birth to independent air 
forces” (p. 19).  In the era of the Air Commandos, the Air 
Force worshipped at this altar by pursuing the development 
and acquisition of the fastest and most technologically-
advanced aircraft and through its insistence on centralized 
command and control.   
The Air Force’s pursuit of the fastest fighters and 
the centralized control of airpower ran counter to the 
culture of the Air Commando.  Although the Air Commandos 
appreciated the technology of aircraft, they often flew 
vintage or surplus aircraft and placed most value on the 
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innovation of individual aircraft components and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures.  This dependence on innovation 
placed a premium on the technical competence, work ethic, 
and character of the men in the organization.  With the 
Army’s emphasis on the concept of service and the human 
element of warfare, “AFSOF personnel represent a curious 
blend of the Army and Air Force altars of worship” 
(Koskinas, 2006, p. 11).  Over time, therefore, it was the 
hardcore personnel of the conventional Air Force itself and 
the processes they produced that became deviant in the 
culture of the Air Commando. 
The disagreement between Heinie Aderholt and General 
William Momyer during the Vietnam conflict serves as a 
poignant illustration of who was seen deviant in the 
culture of the Air Commando.  As the commander of the 
Tactical Air Command, Momyer was a strong proponent of the 
exclusive nature of jet technology and high-performance 
fighter aircraft.  He was quoted as saying, “Where there is 
shooting. . .I don’t believe the USAF should be involved 
with ‘so-called’ low performance aircraft delivering 
firepower” (Trest, 2000, p. 13).  This conviction was 
counter to the culture of the Air Commandos who prided 
themselves in using “whatever capabilities were available 
to get the job done, and when the needed capabilities were 
not there, they improvised.” (p. 12).  Part of life as an 
Air Commando was the constant battle against conventionally 
minded airmen who saw no glamour in flying low and slow in 
direct support of soldiers on the ground. 
The direct support provided to the Chindits in Burma 
by the 1st Air Commando Group is an example of the 
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decentralized control of airpower.  By fragmenting the air 
assets to act in a direct support capacity, the Air 
Commandos were able to satisfy Wingate’s requests in a 
timely and accurate manner.  This intimate relationship 
between members of the air component and the personnel they 
were supporting became the norm for Air Commando 
operations.  The Carpetbaggers were employed in a similar 
manner in support of the OSS in the European theater and 
operations in Korea followed suit as well.  Since 
centralized control is one of the key tenets of airpower, 
such decentralized arrangements were not readily accepted 
by the respective conventional air commanders in each 
theater.  The Air Commandos experienced resistance from 
those who would not accept such decentralized arrangements.  
Such antagonists were clearly deviant in the culture of the 
Air Commando. 
Stories from within the organizations of the Air 
Commandos provide more examples of people seen as deviant 
from the Air Commando culture.  With emphasis on the 
importance of the human component, leaders who did not take 
care of their troops were clearly seen as deviant.  During 
the Vietnam era, a squadron commander at Hurlburt Field was 
relieved of his duty because he would not socialize with 
his troops after work at the club (Trest, 2000, p. 137).  
While other lesser incidents have been recorded, this 
account clearly illustrates the importance of taking care 
of the troops to the Air Commandos.   
Personnel who blindly followed rules and regulations 
were deviant in the culture of the Air Commandos as well.  
This paper has reported the Air Commandos’ disdain for 
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paperwork, their frequent bending of rules, and their 
commonly accepted variations in dress and personal 
appearance.  Air Commandos did not simply break rules for 
the sake of breaking rules, rather they did so in the 
interest of mission accomplishment; they sought to avoid 
failures that “were the result of thinking stuck in 
traditionalism, mired in parochialism, and therefore averse 
to revolutionary ideas” (Torres, 1997, p. 39).  
This section has investigated the organizational 
culture of the Air Commandos by asking the three questions 
introduced in Chapter II.  With reference to the framework 
(Figure 1,) this chapter has identified and described 
various artifacts and values representative of their 
historic legacy.  The following chapter will conclude this 
study by identifying the basic assumptions and shared 
beliefs that served as the foundation for the culture of 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This study has investigated the organizational culture 
of the historic Air Commandos.  In Chapter II, three 
“layers” of organizational culture were presented.  The 
previous chapter examined the top two layers—artifacts and 
values.  This chapter digs deeper by presenting three 
shared beliefs and basic assumptions of the Air Commandos.  
While Chapter III described “reflections” of their culture, 
the next section attempts to present the “essence” of it. 
A. THE ESSENCE OF THE AIR COMMANDOS 
Shared beliefs and basic assumptions represent the 
essence of an organization’s culture.  Such insights are 
gained through the distillation of the organization’s 
values and artifacts.  Shared beliefs and assumptions are 
the heart of culture and help the organization solve its 
basic problems of survival in the external environment and 
integration of its internal processes.   
Throughout the previous chapter, three overwhelming 
themes emerged regarding the basic assumptions and beliefs 
of the Air Commandos.  Each of the themes provides insight 
into the internal integration of the Air Commandos and 
suggests how they negotiated their external environment.  
The shared beliefs and basic assumptions of the Air 
Commandos uncovered over the course of this study are:  
Humans are the most critical resources in an organization; 
innovation, improvisation, and adaptation are more 
important than advanced technology; successful mission 
accomplishment is more important than adherence to standard 
military conventions.   
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1. Humans are Most Critical  
The human element was the most critical resource in 
Air Commando organizations.  Contrary to Carl Builder’s 
assertion that the Air Force has always been obsessed with 
high technology, the Air Commandos were indeed obsessed 
with the technical competence, work ethic, and character of 
their men.   Chapter III provided numerous accounts about 
how the Air Commandos placed priority on the morale and 
operational proficiency of their men.  Leaders were 
committed to leading by example and from the front.  
Inspired by their leaders’ compassion and commitment to 
teach and train, the Air Commandos exhibited genuine 
concern for the well-being of the men and their families.  
They realized that without competent and ready operators, 
the greatest military technology in the world is of little 
value.  This shared belief that “humans are more important 
than hardware” is common to other SOF elements and has been 
established as a “SOF Truth” by USSOCOM (2007, p. 1).   
2. Innovation is Paramount  
Innovation—the ability to make changes to their 
already established aircraft, equipment, and processes—was 
of paramount importance to the Air Commandos.  They 
maintained the combat viability of their vintage or surplus 
aircraft by adopting innovative modifications to equipment, 
tactics, and procedures. Perhaps no other examples better 
illustrate the Air Commandos’ belief in innovation than the 
evolution of the C-47 gunship during Vietnam, the 1st Air 
Commando Group’s use of gliders during Operation Thursday, 
and the conversion of B-24 bombers by the Carpetbaggers 
into aerial delivery and agent infiltration platforms.  The 
 69
three examples were detailed in Chapter III and required 
the implementation of innovative tactics, techniques, and 
procedures in addition to the equipment modifications in 
order to achieve mission success.   
3. Mission Success Trumps Military Convention 
The Air Commandos firmly believed that successful 
mission accomplishment was more important than blind 
adherence to the standards of military convention.  Chapter 
III provided accounts of the flexibility of the Air 
Commandos during the enforcement of rules, regulations, and 
standards of dress, appearance, and conduct.  This 
flexibility was enabled to some degree by the 
implementation of an assessment process through which 
personnel were selected.  It is important to note, however, 
that none of the examples in Chapter III seemed to indicate 
a predisposition for breaking rules for the sake of 
breaking rules, but rather only when such rules served as 
an impediment to mission accomplishment.  Unlike the claims 
of some critics, therefore, the Air Commandos did not seem 
to be “above the rules,” rather they valued the flexibility 
and their commander’s prerogative in complying with the 
“spirit” of directives instead of acting in accordance with 
the strict interpretation of regulations.  As discussed in 
Chapter III, the Air Commandos also bucked contemporary Air 
Force (or Army Air Force) convention by believing in the 
necessity for the decentralized control of their unique 
brand of special operations airpower.  The efficacy of 




airpower is important to the United States’ current War on 
Terror and is a topic for further consideration and 
research.    
B. THE FUTURE OF THE AIR COMMANDO CULTURE  
Chapter I began with a vignette regarding a painting 
that hangs in the 7 SOS at RAF Mildenhall, UK.  The 
painting pays tribute to fallen Air Commandos who were lost 
during a training accident in Albania.  Another painting 
entitled “Carpetbaggers” hangs in a different location in 
the same squadron building. This painting depicts a 
squadron aircraft (MC-130H) performing a resupply airdrop 
onto a snow-covered field somewhere in Europe.  A ghostly 
image of a specially modified B-24 Liberator shadows the 
MC-130H.  The painting recognizes the heritage of American 
special air operations in Europe.  Furthermore, it serves 
as a visual reminder that modern-day members of the 7 SOS 
trace their lineage as Air Force special operators back to 
the Carpetbaggers of the Second World War.  Most 
importantly, however, it reflects the importance of the Air 
Commando culture to members of the contemporary AFSOC 
community.       
Organizational culture is critically important in 
AFSOC.  It promotes desired behaviors in the command’s 
personnel that define what it means to be an Air Force 
special operator.  This study has provided insight into the 
historic culture of the Air Commando; AFSOC’s Mission 
Review of 2005 and the resultant 13 Attributes provided 
insight into the contemporary culture of the command.   
Instead of describing the rich assumptions and beliefs 
of contemporary AFSOC, however, the 13 Attributes seem to 
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be more like guidelines and standards of behavior for the 
Airmen in AFSOC:  Embody the 13 Attributes and one will 
stay out of trouble and will get promoted.  The 13 
Attributes, therefore, are a bit lacking as an indicator of 
contemporary organizational culture.  Future research 
should attempt to close this gap. 
Future research should attempt to more precisely 
decipher the contemporary culture in AFSOC today.  The 
command should solicit the help of qualified professionals 
in accomplishing a longitudinal study of the organizational 
culture of AFSOC.  The results should then be compared to 
the culture associated with the legacy Air Commandos to see 
if discrepancies arise.  Since the command today speaks of 
its personnel as Air Commandos, discrepancies might serve 
as a hidden source of organizational pain.   
The concept of organizational pain was introduced in 
Chapter II.  Organizational pain occurs when there is a 
difference between our espoused values and our real values; 
when it exists, it is detrimental to an organization.  
Chapter III documented many practices of the Air Commandos, 
particularly involving the use of alcohol and rule 
breaking, that are not tolerated in AFSOC today.  If other 
disparities become apparent, the value of molding the 
modern day Airmen of AFSOC after the legacy Air Commandos 
should be questioned.  Does the wholesale adoption of the 
culture and legacy of the historic Air Commandos produce 
more harm than good in AFSOC today?   
It is one thing to recognize organizational heritage, 
it is quite another to integrate that legacy by adopting 
their culture as that of a modern day organization. Perhaps 
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the command could mitigate complications by redefining what 
a modern day Air Commando is—in terms other than those 
borrowed from a self-help book.  Should this prove to be 
too difficult given the term’s historical baggage, perhaps 
the command should seek to rebrand itself through 
association with a different culture (such as a reversion 
towards “Quiet Professionals.”)  Whatever decision the 
command arrives at, it should be reinforced with a 
proactive education and training program.   
Culture must be more than just a poster, pamphlet, or 
slogan; it must be inculcated throughout the command 
through its incorporation into all of the command’s initial 
and recurrent training programs.  Before an AFSOC Airmen 
reports to their unit for duty, they must be indoctrinated 
into the culture of the command.  Future research should 
investigate the mechanisms and best practices requisite to 
the development of such programs.  By promoting and 
reinforcing desired behaviors, AFSOC will be better able to 
build the attributes and qualities that Spulak discusses in 
his theory of special operations.  Well nurtured 
organizational culture is critical to the development of 
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